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ABSTRACT
The effect on coinmerqial banks of exposure to large amounts of developing
country debt has been a topic of increasing concern In recent years. Fear of
default on the part of t1e debtor countries has led to fears for the solvency of
the creditor banks since in nanycasesthe total of outstanding exposure to
risky debtors exceeds the entire capital base of thebanksinvolved. The paper
presents a first effort towards measuring the effects of LDC debt exposure on
the market value of large comniercial value banks in the United States. Our
results indicate that exposure to developing country debt has exerted a
measurable and significant negative effect on the ratio of market to book value
for these banks.
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valuation of bank stock. This paper presents a preliminary effort toward the
goal, investigating the effects of debt exposure on the ratio of market to
book value of the common stock of large commercial banks in the United States.
The Market Value to Book Value Ratio
Unlike the Mexican bond shown in Figure 1, seasoned commercial bank loans
to developing countries are not traded in organized markets. It is therefore
not possible to infer the current market valuation of such claims from
observed trading prices. There is some anecdotal evidexce from the Euromark—
ets that some second—hand tra4ing between banks does exist, and that these
so—called "silent subparticipations" on Latin American debt have been selling
at discounts of ten to twenty—five percent.3 The pricing of new loans to LDCs
also does not give a good indication of market discounts since in the major
crisis cases (like Brazil and Mexico) no new creditors are making loans, and
existing debt is being rolled over at below—market terms.4
Our strategy is to infer the market valuation of existing loans from
changes in bank stock prices. As a rule, existing claims on debtor countries
are carried at par in assessing the book value of commercial banks. Thus,
despite re—schedulings and the risk of default, a l claim on Brazil is car-
ried at 1 book value. The market value of the commercial bank holding this
claim, however, should be below book value to the extent that the risks on the
loan reduce the value of the claim. Thus, one determinant of the book value
(BV) to market value (MV) ratio should be the extent of exposure to prob-
lematic LDC debt.
In this preliminary investigation, we take a standard equation for By/MV
from the literature, and add LDC debt exposure (EX) relative to book value, as—3--
an explanatory variable. The regression equation is
MV/BY =f3Z—aEX/BV (1)
where Z is a vector of traditional variables in bank stock pricing. A sig-
nificant positive coefficient for a will indicate that bank stocks are
reduced in value as a function of their exposure to the LDCs.
Probably the most relevant previous study for ourworkis Kamath (1980),
who analyses the determinants of the market to book value ratio for 52banks
in1974,1975and1976. A variety of variables prove significant: beta,
volume of trading, growth inearnings,and payout ratio, as well as a capital
adequacy variable in one year. This variable is interesting in that Kamath
has utilized a capital adequacy test formulated by Vojta (1973) in which the
ratioof loan loss chargeoffs to capital is used instead of the more commonly
used asset/capital ratios. The fact that this variable is significant only in
1974 (the year of the Franki in National failure) seems to indicate that inves—
torperceptions may be conditioned by highly visible events affecting bank
capitaL Therefore, in the context of exposure to developing country debt,
this result suggests that there may be a similar significance of capital ade-
quacyvariables during periods of investor uncertainty such as the period fol-
lowing August 1982.
Using Kamath's framework, we added to his list of variables the LDCexpo-
sure variable. Our sample on LDCdebtexposure includes 62 commercial banks
in the United States (listed in the Appendix), observed on a quarterly basis
from September 1982 through June 1983. Information on levels of outstanding
exposure to particular countries was obtained from quarterly reports and 10—K— 4-.
formssubmitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission. It should be noted
that small levels of LX exposure are usually not reported to the SEC, as
banks are not required to present disaggregated data of exposure to individual
countries of amounts to less than 0.75%oftotal outstandings. We limited our
focus to exposure to five Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mex-
ico, chile, and Venezuela. These are by far the largest debtors (with
percent of the LDC loansof BIS banks as of end—1982), and are the only coun-
trieswith a comprehensive representation on the 10—K forms. Allotherdata
was obtained from the BankCOMPUSTAT quarterly data tape, with the exception
ofbeta values, which were obtained from the Value Line Investment Survey.
Table 1 provides some summary measures of interest from the data set. We
show in the table the average exposure and MV/By ratios for the entire sample,
and for the most and least heavily exposed banks in the sample. The heavily
exposed banks all have anexposureratio of about 2,0 or higher, while the
leastexposed banks in the sample have no exposure. For all four quarters,
theheavily exposed banks have a considerably lower MV/lW ratio, and the gap
between the two sets of banks widens considerably in 1983:1 and 1983:11.
Thus,it will not be surprising to find a significant effect of EX/BV on
MV/BV, and perhaps an effect that grows over time. Onaverage, the commercial
bankscarried a large amount of LX assets,amounting to more than 70%of
total book value. The average MV/BV ratio indicates that banking stocks were
in general selling at a significant discount relative to book value over the
sampleperiod.
Following the previous work onthe capital adequacy of commercial banks
discussedabove, several different formulations were tested. As a first step,
the formulation used by Kamath was repeated for the four quarters fromTable 1
Exposure Data for Sixty—Two Commercial Banks
Average forEntire Sample
Exposure Market Value
Exposure**Book Value**Book Value Book Value
1982:111 821 781 .121 .712
1982:IV 829 806 .106 .189
1983:1 829 831 .681 .862
1983:11 825 861 .61414 .911
Five Banksin Sample withLowest Exposure/Book Value*
Exposure**Book Value**
Exposure Market Value
Book Value Book Value
1982:111 0 893 0 .7'83
l982:IV 0 9214 0 .851
1983:1 0 9514 0 1.0)42
1983:11 0 10143 0 1.109
Five Banksin Sample withHighest Exposure/Book Value*
Exposure**Book Value**
Exposure Market Value
Book Value Book Value
1982:111 19)432 8783 2.21 .551
1982:IV 19556 8978 2.18 .628
1983:1 19)486 9328 2.09 .666
1983:11 19266 9722 1.98 .6614
*As of September 1982.
**Milljons of $U.s.DEVFLOPING COUNTHY DEBT AND THE MARKET VALUE OF LARGE (X)MMERCIAL BANKS
Theeffect on commercial banks of exposure to large amounts of developing
country debt has been a topic of increasing concern in recent years. Fear of
default on the part of the debtor countries has lead to fears for the solvency
of the creditor banks since in many cases the total of outstanding exposure to
risky debtorsexceeds the entire capitalbase of the banks involved. To take
justone example, Citicorp's claims on Brazil alone amounted to 116% of bank
equity at year end 1982.1 Thus, it is clear that considerations of exposure to
LDC debtcould potentially have quite a large effect on the relative values of
bank stocks.
It has long been acknowledged that the events of August 1982, in which
the Mexican payments crisis focused attention on this problem, helped to
stimulate a discount ofthe value of developing countryobligations in inter-
national capital markets. Figure 1,showing the spread in yield to maturity
ofa Mexican bond over that of a relatively safe World Bank bond, shows that
this discounting was quite substantial, and that the timing of the effect
correspondsclosely to the events of August 1982. Bank stockanalystshave
paid close attention to the level of exposure to developing country debt in
analyses of bank stocks in U.S. securities markets, For example,the Value
LineInvestment Survey stated, "Stocks of major international banks such as
Citicorp have lately been under pressure because of adverse news reports about
Brazil.
However,in spite of this recognition of the importance of foreign debt


































































































































































































































































































































out a high percentage of earnings as dividends rather than retaining them
for reinvestment. In theory, this should not make any difference to the
investor since retained earnings should be capitalized in the price of
the stock. In fact, a good case could be made for preferring payout
ratios if the bank's rate of return on reinvested profits is higher than
the investor's next best alternative. Nevertheless, this variable has
been included both because payout may affect investor perceptions regard-
less of its actual importance and also to facilitate comparison of the
results presented here with those of Kamath;
6. Beta (BETA) —Betavalues obtained from the Value Line Investment Sur-
vey. This variables was included as a proxy for systematic risk;
7. Exposure Variable (EX/BV) —Thisvariable was constructed as the s
of outstanding exposure to Argentina, Brazil, Qtile, Mexico and Venezuela
dividedby total book value.
Theabove formulationutilizesa very specific class of assets (claims on
the LDCs) as an explanatory variable. We also felt that an additional set of
regressions using more aggregate capital asset ratios, as a measure of bank
capitaladequacy would be of some interest. Of the various capital adequacy
variables tested, only one proved significant, total assets divided by the
total book value of common equity plus the value of preferred equity (KAIJQ2).
Regression Results
The first of the regressions discussed above, in which thedeveloping
country exposure variable is used along with a vector of additional variables
to explain variation in the market/book value ratio, was performed for each of—5—
September 1982 through June 1983, with the addition of EX/BV. In these
regressions for following variables were chosen to explain variations in the
market/book value ratio:
1. Rate of Return on Book Value (RORBV) —Thisvariable, measures the pro-
fitabilityof the bank and would be expected to have a positive relation—
ship with the market/book value ratio;
2. Earnings Stability (ERST) —Thisvariable was constructed in a two—
stepprocess. First net current operatingearnings for each bank were
regressedon a time trend. Next, the variance of the regression was
divided by the mean value of earnings over the period to provide a meas-
ure of the stability of bank earnings. It is expected that this variable
should have a negative relation with the dependent variable;
3. Growth Rate of Book Value (BVGRS) —Thisvariable is used as a proxy
forexpected future growth. Insofar as recent experience provides an
accurate measure of such expectations, this variable would be expected to
enterwith a positive sign. Average annual growth rates over the thirty
monthspreceding each observation were used;
4.CommonStock Trading Value (TRDVL) —Thisvariable was usec1 as a
proxy for the marketability of the stock.It is assumed that a larger
trading volume would increase the liquidity and hence the desirability of
a given stock. Thus, this variable is expected to enter with a positive
Si gn;
5.PayoutRatio (POUT) —Manyobservers have maintained that investors
have a preference f or current income. That is, they prefer banksto payTable 2
Determination of Market Value/Book Value
1982:111 1982:IV 1983:1 1983:11
Constant .)428 —.53)4 —155 —.93)4
(.95) (1.30) (1.38) (2.35)a
RORBV .1)49 .136 .180 .150
(703)C (575)C (669)C (639)C
ERST —.001 —.002 —.721E—)4 —.791E—)4




TRDVOL .338 E—5 .112 E—14 .61)4 E—5 .392 E—5
(.56) (1.82) (1.11) (.75)
POUT .002 —.231 1.070 .673
(.00) (.30) (.3) (.i9)
BETA —.018 —.35)4 —.069 .226
(.08) (i.)46) (.2)4) (1.02)
EX/BV —.090 —.079 —.059 —.i6
(2.56)a (2.O)4)a (1.1t3) ()439)C
R2 .65 .63 .6)4 .71




the four quarters from September 1982 through June1983.The results are
presented in Table 2. As can be seen, all variables enter with the expected
signs with the exception of beta and the payout ratio, which switch signs in
one period but are not significant. In general, the most important deter-
minants of the market/book value ratio over this period appear to be the rate
of return on book value, the volume of common stock trading and exposure to
developing country debt. This last variable enters negatively in all four
regressions and is significant in all but the third period. The magnitude of
the coefficients indicates that developing country debt was discounted signi-
ficantly during this period.
To test for the possibility that the bulk of the effect of developing
country exposure on the market/book value ratio might be felt after the issue
of quarterly reports containing such information rather than contemporane-
ously, the above regressions were rerun using the closing market/book value
ratio for the quarter after that corresponding to the independent variables.
In effect, this is an indirect indication of the extent to which such quar-
terly reports contain new information which is acted on subsequent to publica-
tion. As can be seen in Table 3, this formulation results in a comparable R2
together with considerably greater levels of significance for estimates of the
coefficient of LDCEX. It is interesting to note that both the magnitude and
the level of significance of this coefficient increase for later periods.
This seems to indicate that investor perceptions show a "learning effect" as
the full implications of the developing country debt crisis became apparent.
A pooled regression over all four quarters were performed and the results
are presented in Table 4. This regression also indicates a substantial
discount of the value of developing country obligations over the period. AlsoTable
Determination of Market Value/Book Value
(Pooled regressions, explanatory variables lagged one quarter)
Pooled, Dummiesfor




























Significant at p =.001.Table 3
Determination of Market Value/Book Value
(Explanatory Variables Lagged One Quarter)
1982:IVa 1983:1 1983:11 1983:111
Constant —.639 _.l7'1 0.530 —1.111
(1.30) (.LO) (1.06) (2•31)b
RORBV
•133d .l56d .138d .l4Od
(5.15) (6.28) (5.51) (I.t.68)
ERST —.003 —.003 —.001 .14IOE—3
(.90) (.53) (.i')
BVGRS 1.029 .631 •158h
(2.91)C (i.ii) (2.3k)
TEDVOL .866 E—5 •138bE_ E—6 —.86 E—6
(1.32) (2.12) (.15) (.13)
POUT —.062 .226 .368 1.19l
(.01) (.28) (.35) (1.10)
BETA —.282 —.306 .191 .223
(1.09) (1.19) (.i) (.192)
EX/BV _.082b °90b —.125
(2.15) (2.20) (3•28)C (1.63)
R2 .614 .62 .63 .65
.59 .57 .58 .60
Quarter refers to date of dependent variable.
Significant at p =.05.
Significant at p =.01.
Significant at p =.001.—8—
presented in Table 4 are the results of a pooled regression in which dummies
were used to allow unrestricted estimation of coefficients for the debt expo-
sure variable for each of the fourquarters.An F—test of the stability of
this coefficient is rejected at the 5% level. An F—test of the equality of
the coefficients for exposure to individual countries could not reject the
hypothesis that thecoefficients for exposure to each country were equal.
Asdiscussed above, several additional capital adequacy variables were
formulated and tested along with Fl/BY and the same vector of additional
explanatoryvariables. As shown. in Table 5, onlyKADQ2,avery aggregated
ratioconsisting of total assets divided by total equity capital, is signifi-
cant. It is interesting to note that the aggregate capital adequacy is signi-
ficant only in 83:1 while the coefficient for Fl/BY increases both in magni-
tude and significance over the four quarters. The size of the coefficient and
its trend over time are comparable to the results obtained above where the
aggregate asset/capital ratio was omitted. The trends in the coefficients
over the four quarters suggest that while overall capital adequacy concerns
mayhave been important inlate 1982, investor perceptions became more focused
on theoverseas portions of bank portfolios in 1983.
The estimated coefficient for the exposure variable, Fl/BY,isof partic-
ularinterest and its interpretation merits some additional discussion. In
general, we would like to infer the market discount on LDCdebtfran the size
of this coefficient. A rigorous derivation of this value requires an asset
pricing model with a more precisely defined theoretical basis than that
presented here. Nevertheless, the regression results presented allow us to
make inferences which
shedsomelight on ourquestion.Table 5
Determination of Market Value/Book Value
(Using aggregate asset/capital ratio KADQ2, and
explanatory variables lagged one quarter)
1982:IV 1983:1 1983:11 1983:111
Constant —.}-OO .166 _.1459 —1.07
(.78) (.26) (.86) (1.92)
RORBV, .129 .157 .139 .140
(557)C (6•50)c (754)c
ERST —.004 —.003 —.001 —.001
(i.o)4) (1.10) (.50) (1.68)
BVGRS •86b
.626 .739 1.327
(2.86) (1.80) (22)4)a ()413)c
TRDVOL .128 E—14
.196hE_)4 .139E—5 .47)4E—7
(1.81) (2.86) (.26) (.01)
POUT ..l29 .173 .352 1.209
(.i4) (.22) (.33) (i.io)
BETh —.261 —.261 .198 .240
(1.01) (1.05) (.76) (.84)
KADQ2 —.012 —.019 —.00)4 —.005
(i.44) (2.l5)a (.40) (.44)
EX/BV —.03 —.035 •6b —.203
(.91) (.75) (2.6)4) (3•77)C
.65 .65 .63 .65
.60 .59 .58 .60
Significant at p =.05.
Significant at p =.01.
CSignificant at p =.001.— 10—
survivea major default. The fact that bank managers can expect to be penal-
ized in the marketplace to an extent related to their decisions to participate
in developing country debt demonstrates that there is a built—in disincentive
to pursuing such lending, even in the absence of an explicit default. Admit-
tedly, this effect was either not operativeinprevious years or provedan
insufficientcheck on asset expansion overseas, to provide a safeguard frcmi
the current crisis. Nevertheless, evidence that the market does provide
rewards for good performance and disincentives to poor performance may render
redundant some of the recent regulations designed to prevent a recurrence of
these problems.
Further research will focus on two areas. First, an event study of the
effect of the Mexican announcement of August 1982 on bank stock prices should
prove an interesting complement to the results presented here in that they
would give anindication of the "impact effect" of these announcements. 'o
the extent that the onset of the crisis was unanticipated, iiortfolio of hank
stocks relative to that of t1'e market portfolio shnuld give added information
as to the effect onthenet worth of banks.
Secondly,we will seek to use indenendent measures of market perceptions
and valuations of different classes of assets and liabilities to hetter
analyze the effects of differing portfolio composition on themarket value of
bankcapital. 'isk premia on sovereign developing conntry bonds traded in
Euranarkets provide an indenendnt measure of such verceptinns in the case of
developingcountry obligations. Goodman and Sharue (1918) rnvide examples of
the use of other market indices inconjunction with various asset and liabil-
ity classes,"ithough verformed at a much mo—c aggregate level. "xtensjon of
thistype of analysisto the prnbleins discussed here should prnve fruitful,in—9—
Let P be the market value of a 41 claim on the LDC's. Assume that on the
margin a 41 increase in the bank' s liabilities (to depositors or CD holders)
reduces, cet. p. ,themarket value of the bank by 1. Then, a purchase of
1of claims on the LX's financed by a 1 incieasein bank liabilities will
lowermarket value by *(P—1) white leaving book values unchanged. But the
coefficient on EX/BV, a, is in principle the measure of the change in market
value fran such a purchase. Thus, aP-i, or P1 +a.Using the data from
Table 3, for example, ourpoint estimatesfor the price of a 4iofLDC debt
is:
Date 82:IV 83:1 83:11 83:111
Estimated
Price: 4.92 *.91 $.88 *.82
The magnitude of these estimates is cnmparable to anecdotal evidence cited
earlier that sile't suparticipations in syndicated loans to Tatin Americsn
borrowers have sold in this period at a discount of between thirteen and
twenty—five percent. 'f cnrse, this calculation is very crude. As we stated
earlier. ounder measures of Pwillhave to await a better oricing model
than we have offered.
Conclusions FurtherResearch
Ourresultsindicate that exposure to developing country debt has exerted
a measurable and significant effect on the ratio of market to hook value for
large commercial banks. The implications of this for bank management and
regulation are of particular interest in lht of continuing doubt about the
ability of developing countries to service debt and the ability of banks to
survive a major default. The fact tiat hank managers can expect to hepenal—— 12—
NOTES
1. "A Review of 'tank Performance: 1983'dition,"Solomon Bros. Inc.Bank
Securities Dept.
2. Value Line Investment Survey, Sept. 23, 1983, p. 2001.
3.Grant,Charles (1983), "TheLiquifactionof the Euranarkets," Euromoney,
Oct.
4. It is below market in the precise sense that new creditors are not avail-
able at the re—scheduled rates, and "fair—share" rules are required even
to maintain the loans from existing creditors.
5.Fora survey of event study methodologies see: Brown, S. and 3. Warner
(1980), "Measuring Security Price Performance," Journal j Financial
Economics (!.).— 11—
thatan emphasis on pr"xying actual changes in market values in 1 iu of
accounting ratios should pr'v1de a much more accurate determin'tion of the
value of bank caDital.Apppendix 1
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